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Imaginary relish and exquisite torture: The Elaborated Intrusion Theory of desire 
Abstract  
We argue that human desire involves conscious cognition that has strong affective 
connotation and is potentially involved in the determination of appetitive behavior rather than 
being epiphenomenal to it. Intrusive thoughts about appetitive targets are triggered 
automatically by external or physiological cues and by cognitive associates. . When 
intrusions elicit significant pleasure or relief, cognitive elaboration usually ensues. 
Elaboration competes with concurrent cognitive tasks through retrieval of target-related 
information and its retention in working memory. Sensory images are especially important 
products of intrusion and elaboration, since they simulate the sensory and emotional qualities 
of target acquisition. Desire images are momentarily rewarding, but amplify awareness of 
somatic and emotional deficits. Effects of desires on behavior are moderated by competing 
incentives, target availability and skills. The theory provides a coherent account of existing 
data and suggests new directions for research and treatment.  
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The imaginary relish is so sweet 
That it enchants my sense. 
 (Shakespeare, Troilus & Cressida, Act 3, Scene 2). 
Here you are, innocently reading a psychology journal, and a paper suddenly 
mentions someone drinking a cup of excellent coffee at a sidewalk café on a sunny Sunday 
morning. Chances are that you immediately imagine how good it would be to have a cup 
yourself. Maybe you imagine the smell of the freshly ground coffee beans, the smell and taste 
of the coffee, perhaps even the sound of the grinder and the bubble and steam of the espresso 
machine. If you do not especially enjoy coffee, or have just finished a cup, this image may 
have little appeal. But if you would really enjoy a cup of coffee right now, the image has  a 
pleasurable piquancy – a tantalizing enchantment that, like a tickle to your foot, moves easily 
to a sense of torture if the desire cannot be fulfilled. From its inception, the thought captures 
your attention. It has strong emotive power, and there is a sense that it triggers action. You 
may even feel unable to continue to read this paper until you get a cup. 
What are the essential elements of this subjective experience? Our impression is that 
they include the intrusive and often unexpected nature of the initial thought, the imagery of 
the coffee and of drinking it, and the pleasure and torture that image brings. Once begun, it is 
difficult to stop thinking about it—in fact, it is difficult to think about anything else. If the 
affective impact of the desire is particularly strong, its fulfilment may seem imperative, 
although of course it is not inevitable.  
In this paper, we describe an Elaborated Intrusion (EI) Theory of desires, which 
embodies these key aspects of the subjective phenomena as well as encompassing the wide 
range of related empirical evidence. As its name suggests, the theory distinguishes between 
associative processes that trigger intrusive thoughts about an appetitive target and the 
controlled processes of cognitive elaboration that tend to follow those thoughts that have 
stronger affective links. The processing priority provided to the elaboration is responsible for 
the interference with other cognitive tasks. The theory holds that emotive imagery and 
associated sensations are especially important in craving, since somato-sensory links 
contribute a particular piquancy and motivational power to the experience. While the theory 
acknowledges the function of target salience in motivation (Robinson & Berridge, 1993), it 
highlights the affective nature of desires, and draws attention to the duality of those affective 
reactions (the relish and torture in our paper’s title). In contrast to some who have concluded 
that craving is epiphenomenal (e.g. Tiffany, 1990), we argue that desires represent a strong 
motivating force, albeit one that is moderated by other factors such as competing desires, 
skills or availability (e.g. we want to avoid being kept awake or are out of coffee). Our theory 
is unashamedly cognitive, with a focus on human motivation, but consistent with current 
neuroscientific findings from brain imaging and animal research.  
In what follows, we define desire and distinguish it from its antecedents and 
consequences. We then provide an overview of the theory, and work through its key 
propositions, examining the evidence for each, including evidence from our own laboratory. 
We complete the paper with research predictions, including some implications for the 
treatment of dysfunctional desires. 
What do we mean by desire? 
A coherent theory of desire requires clarity of definition and a distinction of desires 
from their antecedents, correlates and consequences. It is especially important that we clarify 
these concepts, since definitions have been subject to some contention, especially in the 
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context of craving for drugs (Kozlowski & Wilkinson, 1987). We use “desire” in the sense of 
an affectively charged cognitive event where an object or activity that is associated with 
pleasure or relief of discomfort is in focal attention. In humans it can be referred to as a 
conscious wish or urge to gain pleasure, relieve discomfort, or satisfy a want, or to engage in 
consummatory behavior associated with these outcomes1. Desire is not simply an emotion 
(contrast Franken, 2003), although it clearly has affective quality: the psychological 
experience includes images or verbal thoughts about the attractive features of appetitive 
objects or activities (Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994). It is better described as a preference for 
something (an object or activity; Zajonc, 1980).  Desire is also conscious; while unconscious 
or implicit processes may underpin some behavioral responses (Robinson & Berridge, 2003; 
Tiffany, 1990), they are not themselves desire, although they can trigger desire. As Robinson 
and Berridge argue, ‘when cognitive elaboration translates incentive salience attributions into 
the level of conscious awareness of the corresponding representations … the initial activation 
of an implicit 'wanting' system contributes to the explicit subjective experience of a conscious 
desire’ (2003, p.36) 
Desires are events in time, and can therefore be described on dimensions of duration 
and frequency as well as by their affective intensity. Like pain or fear, desires are direct 
experiences rather than metacognitions (cf. Toneatto, 1999), although reports or ratings are 
clearly metacognitive (and therefore subject to error). The distinction is important—brain 
activation patterns, for example, may be quite different when the person is attempting to 
evaluate or measure their desire rather than simply experiencing it. Reports of expectancies 
are even further divorced from the phenomena of desire, since they represent reported beliefs 
about the likely consequences of target acquisition, and do not necessarily correspond to the 
immediately relevant aspects of the target that are the focus of attention during an specific 
episode of desire. 
Desires are sometimes inferred from correlated self-reported phenomena such as a 
difficulty in controlling such thoughts (Bohn, Krahn, & Staehler, 1995; Tiffany, Singleton, 
Haertzen, & Henningfield, 1993; Volpicelli, Alterman, Hayahida & O’Brien, 1992), 
confidence in maintaining behavioural restraint or intentions to acquire the target (Tiffany & 
Drobes, 1991; Tiffany et al, 1993). Although these reports may have practical utility in 
assessment instruments, in this paper we separate the desires from these correlated or 
consequential phenomena in order to develop a coherent causal theory. A similar inferential 
issue is raised by animal research, where we cannot ask for reports of cognition or emotion. 
Behavioural indices from humans and animals (consumption rate, approach latency, 
maximum reinforcement ratio, reinstatement of conditioned responses, etc.) at best represent 
indirect indices of the cognitive-emotional events (Koob, 2000; McGregor & Gallate, 2004). 
Desires should also be distinguished from their antecedents such as associated cognition, 
physiological deficits or environmental cues. The occurrence of these events may increase the 
probability of desire, but they do not represent the phenomenon itself. 
We began work on this theory as an explanation of craving for psychoactive substances. 
However, we see the theory as being applicable to all desires, and argue that such a broad 
applicability is in fact essential to an adequate theory of desires and craving. While 
psychoactive drugs appear to sensitize neural pathways involved in motivation (Robinson & 
Berridge, 1993, 2003; Berridge & Robinson, 2003), we argue that the key component 
processes in substance-related craving are the same as for other desires. Although we 
recognize that some people prefer to limit the use of the word “craving” to very strong or 
intense experiences (Kozlowski & Wilkinson, 1987), we argue for a continuity model of 
intensity, and do not make qualitative distinctions between craving and desire. Support for a 
continuity across desired targets comes from various sources. Subjective reports indicate that 
the experience of desire is qualitatively similar across a range of targets, including food, soft 
drinks, alcohol and tobacco (May, Andrade, Panabokke & Kavanagh, 2004). Research into 
the causes, components and consequences of desire, discussed below, reveals no important 
differences between desires for different targets. While some brain mechanisms for particular 
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targets differ (e.g. thirst: Sewards & Sewards, 2000; hunger: del Parigi et al., 2002)—as 
reflected in the differing subjective experience for specific physiological deficits—there also 
appears to be substantial commonalities in final cortical pathways. For example, dopamine 
anatagonists attenuate the motivational properties of food, water and drugs in deprived 
animals (Nader, Bechara & van der Kooy, 1997). The mesocorticolimbic dopamine pathway 
appears to be particularly important in the action of incentives in general (Robinson & 
Berridge, 1993, 2003).  Our paper therefore develops a theory that aims to cover desires in 
general, whether these be mild or intense, for drugs or other motivational targets. 
The Elaborated Intrusion (EI) Theory of Desire 
The Elaborated Intrusion theory of desire derives its title from the separation of more 
basic, associative processes from higher level elaborative processes. The associative 
processes underlie apparently spontaneous, intrusive thoughts about a target that can arise 
while attention is primarily directed to another task. They may take the form of verbal or 
image fragments, or an implicational awareness (cf. Barnard & Teasdale, 1991). Elaboration 
involves controlled processes of search for target-related information and the retention of this 
information in working memory, resulting in highly elaborated cognition about the target.  
The distinction between the associative and elaborative processes is illustrated in 
Figure 1, with elements comprising the conscious experience of desire being displayed within 
the central box, and triggers or sources of information being shown around it. 
______________________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
______________________________________ 
The processes underpinning intrusive thoughts involve learned associations to internal 
or external antecedent events (Figure 1). Five types of these events are distinguished: 
physiological deficit states, negative affect, external cues, other cognitive activity, and 
anticipatory responses to the target (such as salivation). The associations themselves may be 
classically conditioned or they can be semantic or episodic in nature (e.g. recall of past 
experiences). The nature of these initiating processes, indicated by the light arrows in Figure 
1, means that demands for controlled processing or working memory are low, and this gives 
rise to the sense of spontaneity and intrusion into concurrent cognitive activity. While 
associative connections tend to reactivate instigative factors, the intrusive thoughts 
themselves are transitory events. Unless they are attended or retained in working memory, 
thoughts about the target will be vulnerable to distraction by salient stimuli or cognitive 
associates that are unrelated to the target (e.g. a cup of coffee might be nice—my last cup of 
coffee was with Jan—I’d really like to see Jan again).  
However, when the target elicits powerful affective reactions or a keen sense of 
deficit2, we predict that intrusive thoughts will be followed by elaboration. We use 
'elaboration' in the conventional sense, to mean mentally embellishing or going beyond the 
initial stimulus (thus 'elaborative rehearsal' of a word may involve imaging its referent or 
thinking about how it is related to other stimuli or existing knowledge). The elaboration 
component of desire involves effortful cognitive processes (‘controlled’ processes) that are 
triggered by the intrusive thought and its associated affective response, and are indicated by 
the dark arrows in Figure 1. Relevant information is sought, and is then retained and 
manipulated in working memory. The search is both internal (increasing the salience of 
physiological states, episodic memories and target-related cognition such as expectancies) 
and external (increasing the salience of relevant situational cues). Thus if someone 
spontaneously thinks 'I need a cigarette' (the intrusive thought) they may then imagine 
themselves smoking a cigarette, recall the last time they smoked, and wonder whether they 
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have enough money on them to buy a pack of cigarettes. This type of cognition is what we 
refer to as 'elaboration'. 
If you strongly identified with the coffee scenario described at the start of this paper 
and it triggered a desire to get a cup of coffee, you were engaging in elaborative rumination. 
The example illustrates that elaborative desires do not have to wait for associations to 
emerge—they can also be elicited on instruction. Regardless of the way in which elaboration 
is triggered, processing resources tend to be captured. You may well have found it difficult to 
concentrate on the subsequent material in this paper, because the elaborative processing 
competes for priority in the limited-capacity systems of working memory.  
We argue that the coffee example was prototypical in its form. Sensory images are not 
just precipitants of desire, but lie at its heart. While we do not exclude the role of semantic 
processing in desire, we predict that extended episodes of appetitive rumination will typically 
include the construction of sensory images that often are vivid and richly textured, lending 
the experience a sensory immediacy that contributes to its emotional impact and helps to 
explain the exquisite and tantalizing nature of the phenomenon.  
The generation, maintenance and manipulation of vivid images recruits several high 
level cognitive processes (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). Elements of an image, including 
sensory information (for example, the smell of beer), generic characteristics (the typical color 
of beer), specific episodes (how good the beer tasted on holiday), are retrieved from long-
term memory. This retrieval process is controlled by executive processes of working memory 
(Rosen & Engle, 1997). Relevant information may also be obtained from the immediate 
environment and stored in appropriate subsystems of working memory. The visuo-spatial and 
auditory subsystems of working memory (Baddeley, 1986) serve as workspaces for storing 
the information thus retrieved. Manipulation of this information, by modality-specific 
rehearsal processes and amodal central executive processes, contributes to the experience of 
vivid, quasi-lifelike images. 
We argue that progressive elaboration of the target-related thoughts, particularly in 
the form of imagery, is the key process underlying the persistence of desires during craving 
episodes. The operation of elaborative processes does not replace associative ones. Those 
original links remain activated, and their likelihood of emerging into consciousness is 
augmented by the increased attentional priority to target-relevant material. Each type of 
process helps to feed the other. So, the retrieval processes that were activated in the service of 
constructing an image of coffee may well have generated further intrusive thoughts. 
Response memories may also have been activated, and you may have started to elaborate 
plans for obtaining some coffee. Imagined strategies for obtaining coffee may include further 
images of it.  
This is not to say that the episode is indefinitely self-sustaining, even when pleasure 
and a sense of deficit are elicited. In the scenario at the start of this paper, you may have had 
a cup of coffee, and now feel sufficiently satiated that further thoughts about it no longer 
elicit significant affect. Other competing cognitive tasks may also have terminated the 
episode. The continued operation of associative processes may have diverted attention to 
alternative desires, or you may have been so enthralled by this paper that you preferentially 
allocated processing resources to it. Both associative and elaborative processes contain the 
reasons for the termination of episodes as well as the basis for their development. As a result 
of their operation, desires tend to fluctuate in salience and affective intensity over time, even 
in the context of significant deprivation. 
We propose that imagery is particularly effective at maintaining and augmenting 
craving because of its effectiveness in activating emotional and motivational pathways. 
Consummatory fantasies provide a keen emotive edge and motivational power because of 
their similarity with the consummatory experience itself. Conversely, the physiological 
correlates of the affective experience, together with pre-consummatory responses such as 
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salivation, may lend further color to the sensory imagery. We predict that, when other factors 
are controlled, a stronger sense of desire will be derived when the imagined experience is 
more closely associated with affect or is more subjectively vivid (Lang, 1994). More vivid 
imagery is likely when there are more environmental cues to assist its development, with the 
best set of cues provided by consuming a priming dose of the substance. For this reason, the 
theory is consistent with observations that a priming exposure, short of satiation, tends to 
increase desire rather than decreasing it (Ludwig, Wikler & Stark, 1974). 
These aspects of desire imagery would have significant evolutionary advantages. 
More vivid consummatory images would be elicited (and more intense reinforcement 
obtained) as the organism imagined or entered a setting where the target would most likely be 
found. Image vividness would therefore assist in selection of behavioral alternatives and in 
prediction of outcomes. Approaches to the target would both increase image vividness and 
increase the potency of associated affective responses. This would reinforce approach and 
preparatory behaviors to acquisition of the consummatory target. Vivid imagery allows the 
organism to continue seeking out the consummatory target in the temporary absence of 
specific cues. Imagery thereby provides a motivational bridge across extended time periods 
before a consummatory target can be obtained. 
We argue that desires make target acquisition more likely, but not inevitable. Nor 
does the absence of desire preclude consumption. This is not the only route to behaviour, but 
it is a compelling one that can overcome situational or intentional impedances. The impact of 
desire is moderated by the availability of the appetitive target, the balance of other salient 
incentives, and skills and self-efficacy in either procuring the target or inhibiting its 
acquisition (Bandura, 1999). The EI theory predicts that, where other conditions strongly 
favor or inhibit consumption, the level of desire will be less predictive of consumption than 
when other conditions are less extreme. So, if you are reading this paper with an open box of 
chocolates at your side, intense desire is not required before you take one. If you are reading 
it in a library where eating chocolate is forbidden, even an intense desire may not result in an 
attempt to obtain it. Degree of desire is also less relevant when competing incentives are high 
(e.g. a million-dollar modeling contract is riding on loss of weight), and you have the self-
efficacy and skills to resist consumption. On the other hand, if you feel unable to resist 
temptation or there is no reason to do so, the degree of desire for chocolate is very likely to 
predict whether you leave the house to buy some. 
While both intrusive and elaborated thoughts appear to trigger target acquisition, they 
typically do so in different ways. Intrusive thoughts may bias choices of activities or trigger 
very simple “absent-minded” behavior, like reaching for a cigarette, particularly when 
attention is focused on another task. Full awareness may sometimes follow that behavior 
rather than precede it. An associative linkage between focal attention to the target and a 
simple response is highly consistent with the associative processes underlying intrusive 
thoughts themselves. On the other hand, elaborated thoughts serve to maintain the desired 
target as a behavioral goal across temporal delays, and provide response plans that facilitate 
target acquisition through the organization of behavioral sequences. 
Affect is involved in all aspects of the EI theory. Both intrusive and elaborated 
thoughts are linked to reward processes that confer both hedonic tone and a tendency for the 
appetitive thoughts to capture and retain attention. But the predominant emotional reaction in 
many episodes of desire is negative, because negative emotion is both a potential precursor of 
desire and a consequence of it. As a precursor, negative emotion primes awareness of specific 
physiological deprivation and (via episodic and semantic connections) it primes activities that 
could return the person to a positive hedonic state.  Once a desire-related thought emerges, 
awareness of any associated deprivation is further primed. The effect is heightened in the 
context of expected delay or frustration of target acquisition, and under conditions such as 
repeated use of psychoactive substances, where the pleasure or relief afforded by thoughts 
about the substance is increasingly rapidly subsumed by a strong sense of deprivation3. When 
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the perceived deficit is substantial, we can become caught in cycles of elaboration, fleeting 
reward and intensified deficit as we think about the desired target. During a control attempt, 
guilt or anxiety about the intrusive thought or elaboration also contributes to the negative 
state. So the imaginary relish may be sweet, but the deprivation, guilt and anxiety leave us 
tortured. We are like the legendary Tantalus, able to see food and drink, but simultaneously 
tortured by our imagination (Drummond, 2001). 
Components of the EI theory and related evidence  
The EI theory argues that cognitive processes and desire related cognitions intervene 
between the factors that elicit desire, and attempts to consume or abstain from consumption. 
In the following section we outline the main components of the theory, and relate them to 
existing evidence. We begin, conventionally, with the factors that elicit desire, and then 
discuss our more novel distinction between the automatic, associative processes underpinning 
the experience of intrusive thoughts and the controlled, elaborative processes underpinning 
the full-blown experience of desire. We describe the key role that mental imagery plays 
during an episode of desire, and show why this leads to both pleasure and discomfort. 
Finally, we address the relationship between desire and consumption. 
Factors that elicit desire 
As shown in Figure 1, we argue that several factors may elicit desire. These include 
external cues that have conditioned associations to thoughts about the appetitive target and 
associations to other ongoing cognitive activity. Appetitive thoughts can also follow a 
physiological conditioned reaction to an external cue (“my heart missed a beat…she’s 
here!”). A deficit state such as physiological deprivation or withdrawal from a substance may 
also elicit desire, as may aversive emotional states that are not necessarily related to somatic 
deprivation. For example, if a person has eaten chocolate to improve their mood in the past, 
an awareness of negative mood may be sufficient to trigger an association with eating 
chocolate, even if they have just eaten a hearty meal.  
Eliciting factors trigger desire by one of two pathways. The first is via the availability 
of target-related associations in memory. These associations may be semantic, episodic, 
conditioned or primed by previous cognitive activity. In each case, the association emerges 
through the unconscious, uncontrolled activation of memory. The involvement of learned 
associations introduces uncertainty into the prediction of whether a particular cue or train of 
thought will result in a specific desire, although the content of the thought or the salience of 
the cue will of course have an influence. So, our route home may remind us of ways we can 
buy alcohol, or we may remember the need to post a letter. Repeated elicitation of a 
particular desire in the context of specific internal or external cues would be expected to 
strengthen the association and increase the probability of the specific desire being elicited in 
that context, but even in that case the associative linkages still reflect a probabilistic 
relationship.  
A second pathway to desire may introduce further uncertainty to the elicitation 
process. In this case, the initial intrusive thought is of an ambiguous sensation or deficit, and 
there is no dominant association to a specific target. Under these circumstances, elaborative 
processes that focus on attribution of the deficit are likely to be initiated. This notion is 
consistent with an Elaboration Likelihood Model of affect (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984), which 
proposes that a negative mood increases motivation to alter the current mood state, with a 
consequent cognitive style directed towards evaluating the context and searching for features 
that could be ‘causing’ the negative mood. The Elaboration Likelihood Model is strongly 
supported by research evidence on the impact of affect on cognition (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1984).  
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The involvement of attributional and associational processes implies that desires may 
arise from attributional errors or salient but misleading associations. An irregular heartbeat 
may be due to excessive caffeine rather than to a lover’s arrival. Within the EI theory, the 
desire that is elicited will depend on the relative salience of the appetitive target and the 
cognitive availability of related material. We predict that cross-activation of desires will be 
common in conditions where information about the physiological deficit is ambiguous.  
Unless a ceiling in subjective desire is reached, the EI theory predicts that multiple 
prompts would have greater effects than those occurring singly because they increase the 
probability of one or more intrusive thoughts, and contribute a richer body of semantic and 
sensory material to elaboration. In fact, more than one factor may often be required for a 
desire to emerge at all. So, recalling a blazing log fire is only likely to trigger a desire to find 
one if we are aware that we are cold: conversely, an awareness of cold will only activate a 
desire for fire if that associate is activated or a related external cue is encountered. 
Our list of eliciting factors is consistent with the existing research evidence, as is the 
view that the presence of multiple eliciting factors tends to increase the probability and 
strength of subsequent desire. The claim that eliciting factors operate via cognition in humans 
is consistent with evidence that attributional errors can occur, and with demonstrations of the 
particular effectiveness of semantic and imaginal craving induction strategies. 
Physiological deficit and negative moods.  
There is substantial evidence that deprivation or withdrawal can induce desire. For 
example in smoking, abstinence from cigarettes for 6-24 hours is associated with craving, and 
desire to smoke is reduced by nicotine substitution (Jorenby et al., 1996). The activation of 
appetitive associations during withdrawal is demonstrated by the priming of substance-
related words (Jarvik, Gross, Rosenblatt & Stein, 1995). Furthermore, the dopaminergic 
systems that appear to underlie ‘incentive salience’ aspects of reward are differentially 
activated in situations where animals are in deprived states (Nader et al, 1997). 
However, a single-factor model of elicitation that is based on pharmacological effects 
is inconsistent with the current data on the elicitation of craving. For example, a transdermal 
nicotine patch alleviates cigarette craving that is associated with nicotine withdrawal, but 
does not affect reactivity to smoking cues (Tiffany, Sanderson-Cox, & Elash, 2000). Nor 
does a pharmacological model account for the time course of desire during withdrawal. Such 
a model would for example predict that craving for cigarettes would parallel the curve of 
physiological withdrawal symptoms. However, a steady reduction in craving over 25 days 
can be seen from the day people quit smoking – a pattern that omits an initial increase as 
physiological symptoms rise in severity, and extends well beyond the primary withdrawal 
period (Shiffman et al., 1997). In the EI theory, the activation of desires during a withdrawal 
period is subject to the total context of target-related associations and to the outcomes of any 
attributional search that may be initiated. 
A sense of deprivation can be primed by a negative mood. So, a negative mood during 
withdrawal from cocaine is associated with more intense feelings of withdrawal than if the 
mood is less negative (Robbins, Ehrman, Childress, Cornish, & O’Brien, 2000). In a study on 
smokers by Maude-Griffin & Tiffany (1996), a negative mood without accompanying cues 
resulted in significantly greater smoking urges than did either a neutral or positive mood. The 
level of craving resulting from the negative mood alone was as high as that resulting from 
imagery about urges to smoke within a neutral mood context. Similar effects are seen when 
people with alcohol or cocaine dependence participate in a stressful task, whether they are 
seeking treatment or not (Sinha, Catapano, & O'Malley, 1999; Sinha, Krishnan-Sarin, & 
O'Malley, 1997; Sinha, Robinson, & O'Malley, 1998). The effect is replicable across a 
variety of stress-induction paradigms, including imagining a personalized stress situation, 
attempting a digit span task or giving a videotaped speech; (Sinha et al., 1999; Sinha et al., 
1997; cf. Droungas, Ehrman, Childress, & O'Brien, 1995).  
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Research on the availability of mood-consistent information (Bower, 1992) is highly 
consistent with a negative mood making a specific deprivation more highly available. Once a 
negative emotional state either primes or is attributed to a specific deprivation, the associated 
targets (e.g. cigarettes) are also primed. In this way, a mood-consistent retrieval effect 
ironically results in the ultimate retrieval of information with positive or appetitive 
associations. 
When physiological information is ambiguous, the EI theory predicts that cross-
activation of desires (or ‘attributional errors’) may occur. Tentative support for this prediction 
comes from a recent study by Alsene, Li, Chaverneff & de Wit (2003), who found that food 
abstinence increased craving for cigarettes (although smoking abstinence did not increase 
craving for food). The role of cognitive factors in determining the target of desire is 
consistent with animal research showing that motivational systems are not stimulus-specific. 
Thus morphine can serve as a substitute for food reward in food-deprived animals (see Nader 
et al., 1997). The involvement of attributional processes in relation to physiological deficits is 
also consistent with smoking-related expectancies affecting both subjective craving and the 
perceived severity of withdrawal symptoms that are experienced during a period of nicotine 
withdrawal (Wetter et al., 1994).  
In contrast to the evidence on negative mood, there is little evidence that a positive 
mood can prompt craving (Greeley & Ryan, 1995). In the laboratory, effects of a positive 
mood induction are comparable to those from a neutral mood (Maude-Griffin & Tiffany, 
1996). Evidence that a small proportion of relapses in substance control occur in positive 
mood states (Cummings, Gordon, & Marlatt, 1980) are more plausibly explained in terms of 
social norms relating to substance use in celebrations rather than as direct effects of positive 
moods on craving. Within the EI theory, a positive mood is not by itself an elicitor of desire, 
except where physiological arousal from another source is misinterpreted as being related to 
the appetitive target. Additive effects of positive moods on other eliciting factors (see below) 
are seen as occurring because of the accentuation of the pleasure or relief that accompanies 
desire-related thoughts (i.e. the impact of the positive mood is after the instigation of the 
cognition). 
Conditioned cues   
Cues that are associated with past consumption or that signal the presence of a 
consummatory object can elicit desire, even in the absence of withdrawal or negative mood. 
Exposure to alcohol cues increases craving in both alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinkers 
(Cooney, Gillespie, Baker & Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan et al., 1985; cf. Stormark, Laberg, 
Bjerland, Nordby & Hugdahl, 1995), and watching someone pick up and hold a cigarette can 
induce smokers to crave cigarettes (Niaura, Abrams, Pedraza, Monti, & Rohsenow, 1992). 
While much of the cue reactivity research has involved exposure to the sight, smell or taste of 
the consummatory target, associations may also involve stimuli such as the time consumption 
usually occurs (Palij, Rosenblum, Magura, Handelsman, & Stimmel, 1996). They may 
include concurrent behaviors such as smoking while drinking alcohol (Burton & Tiffany, 
1997). A richer set of cues, or a set that is more strongly associated with consumption is more 
likely to elicit craving than sets with weaker associations (Payne et al., 1992).  
Cue reactivity is usually interpreted in terms of classical conditioning, either to 
withdrawal sensations (Ludwig & Wikler, 1974) or to previous consumption (Stewart, de Wit 
& Eikelboom, 1984). A history of classical conditioning has sometimes been assumed rather 
than demonstrated (Greeley & Ryan, 1995), but there is evidence that conditioning can 
prompt craving. In Dols, Willems, van den Hout, & Bittoun (2000), smokers were shown sets 
of cards that depicted smoking cues. A random selection of cards was associated with 
subsequent nicotine administration: these cards later elicited stronger craving for nicotine 
than did the control cards, even though both sets showed smoking cues. Withdrawal 
responses for narcotics can also be conditioned in the laboratory (O'Brien, O'Brien, Mintz, & 
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Brady, 1975), although drug agonistic effects are more consistently conditioned than are 
withdrawal symptoms (Niaura et al., 1988).  
Recent studies have shown attentional biases towards target-related cues in substance 
users. Thus users are more likely to orient towards those cues in the environment that trigger 
or exacerbate craving. For example, smokers responded faster to probes that replaced 
smoking-related pictures than control pictures (Mogg, Bradley, Field & De Houwer, 2003), 
and a positive relationship between the strength of this bias and self-reported craving is 
obtained (Waters, Shiffman, Bradley & Mogg, 2003). Franken (2003) argues that these 
attentional biases are the behavioral expression of dopamine-mediated sensitization of neural 
systems that attach incentive salience to drug-related cues (Robinson & Berridge, 1993; 
2003). She suggests that ‘attentional focusing on drug cues may trigger more explicit 
cognitive processes such as positive drug-related expectancies and intrusive thoughts” (p. 
572). In the EI theory, the intrusive thoughts in turn trigger cognitive elaboration that further 
increases attentional allocation to the antecedents of desire (see Figure 1). 
There is some recent evidence to suggest that a cardiovascular response by alcohol 
dependent people to pictorial alcohol cues could be observed even when the picture was so 
rapidly followed by a masking stimulus that the picture was not consciously accessible 
(Ingjaldsson, Thayer, & Laberg, 2003a). The effect was particularly seen in alcohol-
dependent people who report experiencing higher levels of craving for alcohol (Ingjaldsson, 
Thayer, & Laberg, 2003b). When the high-craving group was exposed to masked alcohol 
cues they also showed a small increase in difficulty resisting alcohol (Ingjaldsson et al., 
2003b). Together, these results suggest that preattentive psychophysiological responses to 
cues may occur, and that the associational influences reflected in Figure 1 are not necessarily 
open to introspective awareness (which is why intrusive thoughts and associated desire 
phenomena feel spontaneous).  
Anticipatory responses.  
Among the responses elicited by environmental cues are physiological anticipatory 
responses (e.g. salivation to food or drink, or increased heart rate). These responses generally 
show a low correlation with subjective desire (Maude-Griffin & Tiffany, 1996). One reason 
may be that the person is not aware of the anticipatory responses, and without such 
awareness, the desire is not elicited, even if behavioral change follows. A study by Monti et 
al. (1993) on alcoholics who were participating in detoxification found that urges to drink 
were not related to the degree of salivary response to alcohol cues. On the other hand, among 
those who did have a salivary response, awareness of the response was associated with 
stronger urges. In the EI theory, salivation may be a consequence of desire-related cognition, 
but it may also be induced directly by conditioned associations with an external or internal 
cue (including thoughts that are associated with the appetitive target but are not directly about 
it). In either case, the salivation may elicit or enhance the desire, but in the EI theory this 
would only occur if the response is attended to and is linked to the appetitive target. For 
example, the person may mistakenly believe that the salivation is due to hunger rather than a 
desire for alcohol. Our argument is consistent with a tendency for desire for a particular 
target to be elicited when that target is highly salient (Rickard-Figueroa & Zeichner, 1985).  
An informational model of anticipatory responses potentially allows error in the 
interpretation of internal stimuli (Schachter & Singer, 1962; cf. Lang, 1994; Marshall & 
Zimbardo, 1979). Such errors might be due to an insensitivity to physiological changes or to 
inattention to the sensory feedback, but they may also may arise from misattribution of 
ambiguous internal states. This can result in responses to one appetitive object being 
confused with responses to another. So, responses to cigarette cues not only involve a rise in 
tobacco craving, but can also involve increased desire for the person’s drug of choice 
(Taylor, Harris, Singleton, Moolchan, & Heishman, 2000). Similarly, the desire of cocaine-
dependent people for cocaine rises to a similar extent after erotic stimuli as it does after 
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exposure to cocaine-related cues (Bauer & Kranzler, 1994). In this case, responses to the 
erotic stimuli were apparently mistaken for responses to cocaine cues. Arousal that does not 
arise from desire (e.g. sympathetic nervous system arousal associated with anxiety) can also 
be misattributed to desire. When undergraduate men were interviewed by an attractive female 
researcher in a study conducted by Dutton and Aron (1974), they were more likely to 
telephone the researcher after the experiment if they were interviewed on a high suspension 
bridge than on a low bridge. Fear arousal appears to have been misattributed to sexual arousal 
in the presence of a salient erotic cue. Such effects suggest that physiological responses act in 
concert with cognitive associations rather than providing unambiguous and specific 
information. 
Desire-related thoughts  
It is not only a matter of cognitive processes moderating the impact of external cues: 
the cues themselves can be cognitively generated. Just the knowledge of imminent 
consumption is enough to stimulate desire (Juliano & Brandon, 1998). The effect of cognitive 
associations is demonstrated by priming experiments, where the priming of positive-
expectancy words results in greater alcohol consumption than neutral words (Roehrich & 
Goldman, 1995; Stein, Goldman, & Del Boca, 2000), and the priming of negative 
expectancies results in less consumption (Carter, McNair, Corbin, & Black, 1998). We argue 
that this change in behavior is likely to reflect a change in the salience of desire-related vs 
inhibitory or aversive thoughts about alcohol, and hence in the net appetitive value of the 
alcohol.  
Desire-related thoughts can also be deliberately induced by semantic instructions. An 
instruction to create an image of the appetitive target is very effective at inducing craving 
(Cepeda-Benito & Tiffany, 1996; Drobes & Tiffany, 1997; Kilts et al, 2001; Maude-Griffin 
& Tiffany, 1996; Tiffany & Hakenewerth, 1991; Zwaan & Truitt, 1998). In the EI theory, the 
directed construction of an appetitive image is prototypical of elaborative desire, rather than 
being just another type of eliciting process. So, subjective vividness of imagery correlates 
strongly with the level of urge in the laboratory (Drobes & Tiffany, 1997; Maude-Griffin & 
Tiffany, 1996; Tiffany & Drobes, 1990; Tiffany & Hakenewerth, 1991).  
Berridge and Robinson (2003) suggest that “vivid cognitive images of reward, which 
potently elicit motivation, might also activate mesolimbic ‘wanting’ circuits [via] ‘top-down’ 
brain circuits involving corticolimbic projections” (p. 511). We suggest that the interactions 
between these high level brain circuits and the mesolimbic ‘wanting’ circuits are likely to be 
two-way, such that increased ‘wanting’ leads to further imagery, which serves not only to 
elicit motivation and desire but also to maintain it. 
Simultaneous activation of eliciting factors.  
Unless a ceiling in subjective desire is reached, multiple prompts would be expected 
to have greater effects than those occurring singly because they increase the probability of 
one or more intrusive thoughts, and contribute a richer body of semantic and sensory material 
to elaboration. This does often appear to be the case.  
Substance-related cues usually elicit stronger craving in the context of negative 
emotion than when they appear alone, and the effect of negative emotion and cues on craving 
is usually additive rather than multiplicative (Cooney, Litt, Morse, Bauer, & Gaupp, 1997; 
Payne, Schare, Levis, & Colletti, 1991; Robbins et al., 2000). This effect is consistent with 
negative moods and cue exposure operating as independent influences (as in the EI theory), 
rather than one moderating the other. This is also true of some other determinants of desire. 
Six hours of smoking deprivation plus imaginal cues had an additive rather than a 
multiplicative impact on craving for cigarettes in Drobes and Tiffany (1997), as did the 
combination of alcohol ingestion and exposure to smoking cues in Burton and Tiffany 
(1997). 
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Some combinations can result in factors that initially had little effect on desires 
acquiring an ability to contribute to the combination. A positive emotion, while itself an 
ineffective elicitor of craving (Greeley & Ryan, 1995) can augment the impact of substance-
related imagery on craving, and the combined effect can be as strong as that of negative 
emotion (Maude-Griffin & Tiffany, 1996; Tiffany & Drobes, 1990; cf. Taylor et al., 2000). 
Berridge and Winkielman (2003) report that participants exposed to subliminal affective 
faces did not report any change in mood, yet those who saw happy faces drank more of a 
freely available soft drink, while those who saw angry faces drank less, but only if 
participants were already thirsty. Within the EI theory, a positive mood would accentuate the 
ability of the appetitive thought to elicit reward, because the positive emotion would share 
hedonic tone with the ‘liking’ aspect of reward (Robinson & Berridge, 1993; 2003). There is 
also evidence that the presence of craving then modifies the emotional context by drawing 
attention to deprivation (“sense of associated deficit” in Figure 1). Ongoing smokers who 
imagined a positive emotional scene in a study by Maude-Griffin and Tiffany (1996) had a 
less positive emotional response when the scene included smoking images than when it 
omitted them. Conversely, inclusion of an urge component in a negative emotional context 
also blunted the negative mood.  
Distinction of associative and elaborative processes 
The distinction between the processes underlying intrusive and elaborated thoughts is 
similar to the distinction of automatic and controlled processing, which has a long history in 
cognitive psychology (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). It is also similar to Stacy’s (1995, 1997) 
distinction between memory associations and explicit introspections about expectancies, 
although it incorporates broader perspectives on the nature and origins of both phenomena. 
By using the term “intrusive thought”, we deliberately infer a parallel with similar 
phenomena that occur in a negative affective context, such as in anxiety or post-trauma 
reactions (Tunis, Delucchi, & Hall, 1994).  
In contrasting intrusive and elaborated thoughts, we emphasize that it is the 
underlying processes rather than the contents of the cognition that we are contrasting. While 
the process of elaboration provides an opportunity for the assembly of complex and highly 
articulated informational composites, an associative process may lead to a cascade of data 
that is similar to the content that is retrieved by directed search. For example, recall of an 
episodic memory may be triggered involuntarily by a sequence of associations or deliberately 
by directed search. Nonetheless, there is some evidence from self-report studies, discussed 
below, that people can distinguish subjectively between spontaneous thoughts that apparently 
trigger desire and images that are a key element of the desire itself.  
The distinction between intrusive and elaborated thoughts is critical to developing an 
understanding of the initiation and impact of desire. Elaborated thoughts can be derived in 
response to instruction (as in the image at the start of this paper), by initiating target-related 
search and retention processes. However, we contend that intrusive thoughts represent a more 
typical gateway to ruminative episodes and that they continue to be elicited throughout those 
episodes. It is intrusive thoughts that mediate the experience of sudden, unexpected yearning 
for a cigarette years after people stop smoking. Evidence that intrusive thoughts do often 
form a gateway to episodes of craving was obtained by our research group in a study based 
on a questionnaire given to prospective university students about the triggers and experience 
of a current craving for food, tobacco, soft drink or alcohol (May et al, 2004). Of a list of 
potential triggers, ‘I suddenly thought about it’ was rated joint top, along with ‘I felt 
hungry/thirsty/tired/physical discomfort’.  
If intrusive thoughts almost inevitably lead to elaboration, and if the process of 
elaboration then elicits additional associations, can a practical distinction be made between 
the two? We argue that such a distinction can be made, and that it is an important one. We 
predict that under some circumstances intrusive thoughts only have a fleeting impact on 
attention, or attract only partial awareness. This is likely to occur when competing cognitive 
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demands are substantial, especially if successful performance of the concurrent task has a 
high incentive value – e.g. a momentary sensation of hunger during a public speech may soon 
be forgotten. Such fleeting attention will be more likely when there is a low level of 
deprivation or need, or weak associations between the thought and affective and motivational 
systems (“Some carrots right now would be quite pleasant”). We would expect that these 
events would not be highly salient in memory, but that people would be able to report on 
their occurrence as long as the report was proximal to the event. Self-report evidence in 
support of the phenomenon of “fleeting intrusions” is being provided by a current study we 
are conducting on people with alcohol misuse who are trying to reduce their drinking. 
Preliminary data from 49 participants showed that 92% reported experiencing at least some 
thoughts about drinking in the previous 24 hours that “just pop in and vanish” without an 
attempt to eliminate them. This suggests that fleeting intrusions may be a common 
phenomenon, even in the context of substance misuse.  
The distinction between intrusive and elaborated thoughts also has importance for 
attempts at control. We propose that obsessive craving or desire (Anton, 2000) – in the sense 
of unwanted, intrusive appetitive thoughts – is a general feature of desire and its attempted 
suppression, rather than a phenomenon that is restricted to particular individuals. Suppression 
of a thought that has appeared in awareness should at best be ineffective, since the 
intrusiveness of such thoughts is actually accentuated by the attempt (Lavy & van den Hout, 
1990). Following Wegner (1994), we argue that the phenomenon occurs because of two 
parallel processes. On the one hand, distraction requires a high level of cognitive effort, and 
this effort is difficult to maintain in the face of competition for cognitive resources. On the 
other hand, the monitoring of violations, which requires fewer cognitive resources, activates 
desire thoughts (“Have I thought of alcohol yet? Oh no, I have now”). Furthermore, the 
detection of cognitive violations often leads to negative self-appraisals (“I’m so weak and 
disgusting to be thinking that”) and reduced self-efficacy about control of thoughts and 
behavior. The resultant distress then intensifies a bias toward deficits and triggers further 
intrusive thoughts. The monitoring of violations in desire control is therefore another initiator 
of desire, and ironically undermines the very control that is attempted. This is not to say that 
control of desire cognition is impossible. People can preempt intense episodes of desire by 
controlling potential triggers, e.g. by avoiding situations that are rich in conditioned cues and 
maintaining positive mood. They may also engage in alternative pleasurable activities that 
command attention. Such strategies mean that people do not have to be totally at the mercy of 
their own associative processes (Bandura, 1999). 
Associative effects on cognitive tasks 
Our dual-process view of craving suggests that two different types of cognitive 
phenomena should be demonstrable. Effects of priming or activation of target-related 
networks should arise from the implicit or automatic associative route to desire. Interference 
with other demanding cognitive tasks should arise because the directed search and retention 
in elaboration requires limited cognitive resources. Some priming may of course occur 
because of increased exposure to target-related stimuli by users of a substance versus non-
users (e.g. Stacy, 1995). Increased priming during periods of subjective craving or 
deprivation provides stronger evidence of automatic cognitive processes. Such priming or 
activation is indicated by evidence that the lexical processing of smoking-related words is 
enhanced after overnight abstinence from smoking (Jarvik et al., 1995). Similarly, Aarts, 
Dijksterhuis and De Vries (2001) showed that thirsty participants responded faster to 
drinking-related items in a lexical decision task than participants who were not thirsty. An 
increased availability of substance-related associations in the context of either overnight 
cigarette deprivation or an attempt to quit smoking was also demonstrated by Phillips, 
Kavanagh, May & Andrade (in submission). In response to a request to generate words about 
relaxation, more smoking-related words were obtained from deprived or quit smokers than 
from either non-smokers or non-deprived smokers. There is some evidence that the number 
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of memory associations generated in response to drug-related stimuli predicts subsequent 
drug use, and does so independently of a measure requiring elaborative processing (explicit 
expectancies; Stacy, 1997).  
A commonly used paradigm involves a modification of the Stroop color-naming task. 
Overnight smoking deprivation results in impeded color naming of smoking-related words 
(Gross, Jarvik, & Rosenblatt, 1993; Phillips et al., in submission), and food deprivation has 
similar effects on food words (Channon & Hayward, 1990 cf. Lavy & van-den-Hout, 1993). 
This may reflect priming, or possibly attentional changes that direct processing towards 
desire related stimuli. 
Evidence from cognitive tasks on elaboration 
Studies on concurrent cognitive tasks are consistent with our contention that the 
elaboration of desire-related thoughts engages considerable cognitive resources and therefore 
impairs performance on other tasks that compete for these resources. Since focal attention is 
one of the tasks that draws on limited working memory resources, an attentional task that is 
unrelated to the desire should be impaired by concurrent desire-related elaboration. So, probe 
reaction time is slowed during cue exposure with smokers (Cepeda-Benito & Tiffany, 1996; 
Sayette & Hufford, 1994), alcoholic patients (Sayette, Monti, Rohsenhow, Gulliver, et al., 
1994) and opiate addicts (Hillebrand, 2000). Probe reaction times in participants who are 
both substance-deprived and exposed to related cues are significantly associated with the 
level of craving after the task (Green, Rogers & Elliman, 2000; Sayette & Hufford, 1994; 
Sayette et al., 1994). Longer probe reaction times are also associated with the perceived 
frequency of ‘obsessive thoughts’ about the substance in the previous week (Franken, Kroon, 
& Hendriks, 2000), indicating that people are often aware of a cognitive impact from 
substance-related intrusive thoughts and their elaboration, and (since obsessive thoughts tend 
to be resisted during a control attempt) that such cognitive interference is probably made 
worse by the effects of attempted thought suppression.  
Cognitive impairments are not restricted to speed of reactions to probes, but occur on 
a wide range of tasks requiring sustained attention or working memory. For example, an 
imaginal urge induction in ongoing smokers impaired the accuracy of reading 
comprehension, particularly on more complex sentences and in participants with a low 
reading span (Zwaan & Truitt, 1998). While mathematics performance was not impaired 
when heavy drinkers were exposed to alcohol-related cues in Bradizza, Lisman, & Payne 
(1995), that study tested only college students (who presumably had moderate to high 
mathematics ability) and confounded a positive emotion induction with cue exposure.  
In summary, the evidence on cognitive tasks suggests that desires alter the ability of 
external cues to activate associated cognitions and conscious allocation of attention to target 
information. Furthermore, extended episodes of desire appear to take up resources in limited-
capacity systems of working memory, and thereby interfere with the performance of other 
tasks that compete for this capacity. The EI Theory captures this phenomenon, placing 
elaborative imagery processes at the heart of desire. 
Evidence for intrusive thoughts from attempts to inhibit them  
When people are trying to inhibit the acquisition of appetitive targets, desire-related 
thoughts often resemble obsessional thinking (Modell et al, 1992). The parallels include the 
intrusive quality of the thoughts, the difficulty in banishing them from awareness and their 
tendency to produce distress (Modell et al., 1992). There are also parallels on a 
neuroanatomical level, with similar brain structures being activated in people with a 
preoccupation with craving as in obsessive-compulsive disorder (Ciccocioppo, 1999; Grant et 
al, 1996; Volkow & Fowler, 2000). While the intrusive quality of desires and urges partly 
derives from their association with pleasure and discomfort, particularly in the context of 
deprivation or withdrawal, another potential source of intrusion comes from attempts to 
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suppress the thoughts. While there is evidence that recall can be inhibited by prior practice of 
recall suppression (Anderson & Green, 2001), very different effects are obtained from 
suppression of highly available material that has already been retrieved. Even the suppression 
of non-emotive thoughts is a very difficult enterprise that can usually only be accomplished 
for short periods when other cognitive demands are low (Wegner, 1994). Attempts at 
suppression typically produce higher frequencies of the thought either during (Lavy & van 
den Hout, 1990; Merckelbach, Muris, van den Hout, & de Jong, 1991; Salkovskis & 
Campbell, 1994) or after the attempted suppression (Clark, Ball, & Pape, 1991; Clark, 
Winton, & Thynn, 1993; Harvey & Bryant, 1998). Distraction from emotive thoughts can 
however reduce the emotional response—at least in depression (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1993). 
There are very few studies on suppression of appetitive thoughts. In a study of heavy 
drinkers by Palfai, Monti, Colby, and Rohsenhow (1997), participants who were instructed to 
suppress urge-related thoughts were significantly faster at judging the personal relevance of 
alcohol expectancies, suggesting that these were more cognitively accessible. Salkovskis and 
Reynolds (1994) examined the effects of thought suppression in smokers asked to monitor 
smoking thoughts, to suppress smoking thoughts, or to combine suppression and breathing 
exercises (‘relaxation’). The relaxation instructions resulted in a lower frequency of smoking 
thoughts both during and after the task than the other two conditions. Those in the monitoring 
group, who did not suppress smoking thoughts, had a lower frequency of the thoughts than 
those in the suppression group  
While attempted suppression of desire-related thoughts is counterproductive, attention 
diversion without suppression may have some success. When external constraints mean that 
consumption is expected to be delayed, people sometimes initiate strategies to reduce the 
discomfort associated with unsatisfied desires (e.g. by diverting their attention from the cues). 
These strategies still require cognitive resources. When smokers believed they would have to 
wait 3 hours for a cigarette in a study by Juliano and Brandon (1998), exposure to smoking 
cues did not significantly increase their immediate subsequent level of craving, but did 
increase their reaction time to auditory probes. In contrast, a group who believed they could 
smoke within 20 minutes showed an effect of smoking cues on immediate subsequent desire, 
but no increase in probe reaction time. Even in continuing users, attempted control of desire 
is likely to be temporary or be affected by other tasks. So, a second rating of desire after the 
cognitive task showed effects of smoking cues that were of similar magnitude in both groups. 
The competing cognitive task was not only affected by the attempt to control desire –
 apparently, it also impeded that attempt. 
In summary, the evidence on thought suppression in desire is that, as in other kinds of 
intrusive thoughts, the attempted suppression of desire exacerbates its intrusiveness. In the EI 
theory, monitoring suppression increases the availability or salience of intrusive thoughts. An 
alternate strategy is needed to reduce this salience and the resources available for subsequent 
elaboration. 
Neuroimaging studies 
Patterns of brain activation during episodes of craving provide further evidence that is 
consistent with a distinction between associative and elaborative processes. A neuroimaging 
study of craving by Grant et al (1996) used paraphernalia related to cocaine use to elicit 
craving in cocaine abusers, and compared the resulting changes in glucose metabolism with a 
control condition (arts and crafts paraphernalia) and with control participants who did not use 
cocaine. Grant et al noted that all the regions that responded to the drug paraphernalia in 
cocaine users are associated with memory. Regions associated with differences between 
conditions or with increased levels of craving were those associated with working memory 
(dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), explicit episodic memory (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
medial orbitofrontal cortex, retrosplenial regions of the limbic cortex, parahippocampal gyrus 
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and the cerebellum), and emotional expression or facilitation of memory encoding following 
emotional arousal (amydgala). The involvement of working memory and long-term memory 
areas is consistent with our contention that cognitive elaboration is a key component of 
craving  
Grant et al suggested that the observed increase in orbitofrontal activity reflected 
intrusive thoughts. This interpretation is consistent with the activation of this same region in 
patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (Saxena, Brody, Schwartz & Baxter, 1998; Zald 
& Kim, 1996). Grant et al’s (1996) study therefore observed an activation of brain regions 
that was consistent with the occurrence of intrusive thoughts and elaborations. Subsequent 
neuroimaging studies have broadly replicated the finding that craving cues activate prefrontal 
and orbitofrontal regions associated with working memory, long-term memory and intrusive 
thoughts (Bonson et al, 2002; Daglish et al, 2001; George et al, 2001; Maas et al, 1998; Posse 
et al, 2001). These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that desire involves cognitive 
elaboration, involving consciously-directed retrieval of information from long-term memory 
and manipulation of that information in working memory, as well as associative processes 
leading to intrusive thoughts. However the interpretation of data from neuroimaging studies 
clearly involves inferences about correlated activations rather than direct tests of the 
distinction between intrusive and elaborative processes, and the time resolution of current 
neuroimaging procedures is insufficiently short to capture relatively transient phenomena 
unless they are repeatedly activated. 
Imagery is a key type of desire cognition 
We propose that a key and neglected feature of elaboration in desire is the 
development of images or fantasies about the consummatory target or experience or about the 
expected effects of consumption. In making this claim, we emphasize that such images are 
not restricted to visual content – in fact, some of the most powerful images may involve 
smell, taste, touch or hearing. While we acknowledge that verbal desire-related thoughts also 
occur, we argue that imagery is central to the naturalistic experience of most if not all of the 
more intense craving episodes. When people have the thought “what I would do for a log fire 
right now”, we argue that it is not the propositional meaning of that sentence that makes their 
skin tingle and captures their attention. It is features that the thought elicits that seem more 
closely linked to our appetitive emotional reaction – the warmth of the fire, the smell and 
crackle of the logs, or perhaps the vision of our lover in the dancing firelight. Even in cases 
where we encounter powerful environmental cues such as the wafting smell of freshly baked 
bread, we elaborate those cues internally, imagining the sight, texture or taste of the bread. 
Subsequent responses are more to the elaborated image than to the simple cue. 
We know that imagery is a very effective means of eliciting craving (e.g. Green, 
Rogers and Elliman, 2000; Tiffany & Drobes, 1990) and that the vividness of an imagined 
urge induction scene is positively correlated with the strength of the craving thus induced 
(Harvey, Kemps & Tiggemann, in press). There is some self-report data showing imagery 
during craving in naturalistic settings, but there has been no systematic study of desire-
imagery per se. Neuroimaging studies could potentially help to test the hypothesis that 
imagery typically occurs in craving, by showing activation during craving of brain areas 
associated with mental imagery tasks. We would expect that sensory images during craving 
would be associated with activation in similar areas to those activated in comparable types of 
imagery in the same sensory domain— (e.g. Belardinelli, di Matteo, del Gratta et al., 2004; 
Handy, Miller, Schott, Shroff et al., 2004; Knauff, Kassubek, Mulack and Greenlee, 2000; 
Mazard, Tzourio-Mazoyer, Crivello, Mazoyer et al., 2004; Parsons, 2003). Visual craving 
imagery would also be expected to recruit areas that overlap with those required for other 
visuo-spatial working memory tasks (Henson, 2001). However, existing neuroimaging 
studies on craving have typically used visual stimuli or imaginal cues in both the craving and 
neutral conditions, giving little scope for detecting differential activation of imagery regions 
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during craving. Our imagery hypothesis could be tested by future studies of craving effects 
on brain activation during performance of tasks with minimal visual or imagery content.  
Self-Report data 
Smokers in a study by Salkovskis and Reynolds (1994) reported that imagery formed 
an important component of craving. Images of “yourself under stress, having a cigarette to 
help calm down or cope” or “yourself in a relaxed place, enjoying a cigarette” were among 
the most frequent and intense smoking-related thoughts. In Westerberg’s (2000) study, 
responses to questionnaire items referring to taste imagery were significantly associated with 
alcohol craving. Our ongoing study on people in an outpatient treatment program for alcohol 
misuse (referred to above) is finding that visual as well as taste imagery is emerging as a 
common feature of desire for alcohol, but that sounds and smells are experienced by only a 
minority of participants. Imagery is not restricted to alcohol. Our research group has found 
that reports of imagery (e.g. “I am visualizing it”) are commonly reported during craving for 
a range of substances, including foods (May et al, 2004). 
Interference with imagery 
Other recent studies support our hypothesis that mental imagery is a key component 
of craving by showing that unrelated imagery tasks reduce craving. A study by Panabokke, 
May, Eade, Andrade & Kavanagh (under review) induced craving by asking smokers to 
abstain from smoking prior to coming into the laboratory and then to read a multi-sensory 
urge induction script. A control group smoked ad lib until arriving at the laboratory and then 
read a multi-sensory neutral script. Participants rated their craving for cigarettes and then 
formed visual or auditory images in response to verbal cues (e.g. ‘a game of tennis’, ‘a 
telephone ringing’ respectively), and again rated their craving after each of three blocks of six 
imagery trials. Craving in the abstaining smokers was reduced to the control group’s level by 
visual imagery and by auditory imagery paired with a dynamic visual noise display known to 
disrupt imagery, but not by auditory imagery alone. 
Harvey et al (in press) replicated this study with a sample of dieters and non-dieting 
controls. Participants imagined a food-related or control (holiday) scene and then performed 
three blocks of six imagery trials, as in Panabokke et al’s study. For dieters and non-dieters, 
the visual imagery task reduced craving more than the auditory imagery task, but this was 
only the case following the food-related induction scenario. The urge-induction scenarios 
used in both studies were intended to be multi-sensory so that any interference effects should 
not be attributable to the use of visual imagery to induce craving. Nonetheless, there is a need 
to replicate these findings without the use of an imagery task to induce craving.  
Kemps, Tiggemann, Woods and Soekov (2004) asked dieting and non-dieting women 
to form images of food-related and non-food items, to rate the vividness of their images, and 
to rate their level of craving for food. Food-related images were associated with higher 
craving ratings than the non-food images. Concurrent visuo-spatial tasks known to disrupt 
visuo-spatial imagery and working memory reduced the vividness of all images and, for the 
food-related images, reduced the associated level of craving. These studies thus show that 
interfering with visual imagery reduces craving, a finding consistent with our hypothesis that 
imagery is a key cognitive engine in craving. 
Imagery and emotion 
There is evidence that mental imagery taps many of the cognitive (Kosslyn, 1994) and 
brain processes employed in perception (Klein, Paradis, Poline, Kosslyn & Le Bihan, 2000; 
Kreiman, Koch & Fried, 2000; O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2003; Wheeler, Petersen, & 
Buckner, 2000; Yoo, Freeman, McCarthy & Jolesz, 2003). We suggest that activation of 
these processes triggers qualitatively similar emotional responses, regardless of whether the 
stimulus is perceived or imagined. There is evidence that imagery and emotion are closely 
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linked. Imagining emotive memories or situations induces physiological changes indicative 
of heightened affect (Bywaters, Andrade & Turpin, 2004a; Witvliet & Vrana, 1995). 
Intrusive imagery in post-traumatic stress disorder is characterized by high levels of arousal 
during the imagery period (Witvliet, 1997) and patients’ images are particularly associated 
with memories of peak emotional distress during trauma (‘hotspots’; Holmes, Grey & Young, 
in press). Very recent research suggests that imagining (rather than verbally processing) 
negative situations leads to greater increases in state anxiety (Holmes & Mathews, 2004). 
There are indications that similar links between imagery and emotional arousal are also seen 
in desires: for example, imagining and describing experiences of craving induces increased 
systolic blood pressure and an increased heart rate during abstinence from opiate use 
(Weinstein et al, 1997). 
Mental images that are rated as more vivid tend also to be rated as more emotive and 
arousing (Bywaters, Andrade & Turpin, 2004b). Interfering with images of emotive scenes or 
memories by means of concurrent cognitive tasks, leads to reductions in the rated emotional 
response to the images as well as reduced image vividness (Andrade, Kavanagh & Baddeley, 
1997; Kavanagh, Freese, Andrade & May, 2001; van den Hout, Muris, Salemink & Kindt, 
2001).  
In sum, there is empirical support for our claim that imagery is central to craving. 
Imagery is a common feature of the subjective experience of craving, and manipulations of 
imagery affect craving. Imagery of emotional scenes is associated with emotional responses, 
consistent with our argument that imagery, and elaborative processing more generally, 
triggers the emotional changes that characterize episodes of craving. The emotional aspects 
of desire are discussed next. 
Desires involve both pleasure and discomfort 
We argue that reward-related processes are critical both to the initiation and 
maintenance of appetitive rumination. Initial thoughts about the consummatory target 
generate some of the same neurochemical processes and physiological sensations that are 
related to ingestion of the target substance or engagement in the target activity (albeit in a 
weakened or partial form). The response may be heightened by generalized pleasurable 
arousal or by anticipatory physiological responses (such as salivation). In cases where a 
strong sense of deprivation is present, the EI theory predicts that a transient and partial relief 
from the perceived discomfort is initially experienced. In situations where deprivation is less 
severe or the stimulus is particularly attractive, the experience is predicted to be initially 
pleasurable. Neurochemical processes and brain pathways that underlie positive and negative 
reinforcement may well have significant differences (Verheul et al, 1999), but within the EI 
theory they have a common function – immediately increasing the salience of the thought and 
reinforcing attention to it. Each successive elaboration initiates a further burst of this positive 
activation, and more articulated imagery improves the match of the experience to the actual 
activity, intensifying the momentary sense of pleasure or relief. Continued rumination is 
thereby reinforced.  
However, awareness of pleasure or relief also draws attention to other aspects of 
somatic states. The partial and fleeting nature of the reaction and the fact that any pre-
existing physiological deficit has not been relieved is then in focal awareness. The positive 
sensation soon dissipates, but the sensations from the physiological deprivation remain 
available. Thus, the initial positive reaction reinforces elaboration, but a renewed and 
strengthened sense of deprivation then follows. The immediate and intensified relief afforded 
by elaborated imagery continues to motivate further search, despite a keen sense that the 
previous image was no substitute for the real thing.  
Within the EI theory, the overall affective response to the desire or urge experience is 
expected to be positive or pleasurable only in situations where there is no significant deficit 
state, because the aversive content of that state would otherwise dominate the experience. For 
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this reason, a delay (or even the expectation of delay) turns an initially pleasurable desire into 
a highly aversive craving. The extent of delay that would produce such an aversive effect 
would be predicted to be shorter in cases where deprivation was more severe or substance 
dependence was more marked. 
Neuroimaging studies 
Data from imaging studies are consistent with the notion that desires involve affective 
reactions. Desires are associated with activation of limbic regions that are associated with 
emotional processing and reward, such as the amygdala and anterior cingulate gyrus 
(Childress et al, 1999; Daglish et al, 2001; del Parigi et al., 2002; Kilts et al, 2001; Maas et al, 
1998; Posse et al, 2001). Selective anterior cingulate activation in response to drug cues 
precedes subjective reports of craving (Wexler et al, 2001) and is reduced by treatment for 
drug-dependency (Schneider et al, 2001). These systems are common to other emotional 
situations. Thus Kilts et al (2001) replicated the finding of increased amygdala activation 
following a personalized craving script rather than a neutral script, but found that amygdala 
activation did not differ significantly between the craving condition and a personalized anger 
script, suggesting that it reflects general emotion changes that are not specific to craving. 
Garavan et al (2000) used fMRI to study thirteen putative craving sites. Only three of these 
sites – anterior cingulate, right inferior parietal lobe, and caudate/lateral dorsal nucleus – 
showed greater activation in cocaine users watching a cocaine film than watching a sex film. 
Garavan et al argued that the neural substrates of cocaine craving are the same as those of 
normal responses to evocative stimuli. Their findings, and those of Kilts et al (2001), are 
consistent with the view that craving and desire in general are part of a continuum of 
phenomena generated by normal cognitive-emotional-motivational systems. 
Pleasure and relief 
Desires are pleasurable when consumption is imminent. Just thinking about 
prospective consumption clearly is pleasurable when there is no significant delay before 
consumption and there are no immediate concerns about negative effects from it (Zinser, 
Baker, Sherman, & Cannon, 1992). While craving can be accompanied by physiological 
signs of withdrawal (Wikler, 1973), more consistent parallels between physiological cue 
reactivity and agonistic substance effects are seen (Drobes & Tiffany, 1997; Niaura et al., 
1988; Stewart et al., 1984). The existence of internal reinforcement for craving is supported 
by associated activation of mesocorticolimbic dopamine reward pathways in the brain that 
are also activated by ingestion of most psychoactive substances (Koon, 1992; Stewart et al., 
1984; Wise, 1996; cf. Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2003). One suggested mechanism for an 
effect of naltrexone on alcohol craving is that it may blunt the pleasurable effects from 
imagined consumption (Verheul et al., 1999), as well as the effects of actual consumption. In 
the case of alcohol, there is also evidence for rises in the excitatory transmitter glutamate in 
the context of a conditioned cue—an effect that is not only likely to feed into memory 
systems, but also into the emotion and reward systems (de Witte, 2004).   
The existence of a reward mechanism for desire-related thoughts helps to explain the 
puzzle about why people would otherwise dwell on these thoughts, even though they 
ultimately feel dissatisfied and even tortured by the experience. This same mechanism may 
be the one responsible for expectancy effects from consumption. If a person with alcohol 
dependence has a drink they believe is alcohol, craving for alcohol is triggered, whether or 
not alcohol was actually present in the drink (Laberg, 1990; Ludwig et al.,1974). In fact, 
Ludwig et al. (1974) only found a differential increase in craving after alcohol when people 
were told they had received alcohol (cf. Stockwell, Hodgson, Rankin, & Taylor, 1982). This 
suggests that when the pharmacological effects of the substance are sufficiently weak or are 
easily confused with concurrent emotional reactions, the reward that is triggered by imagined 
sensations can have a more powerful influence on craving than pharmacological effects of 
consumption. Similar effects can occur with relief of deficit states. The oral administration of 
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methadone during the first three days of withdrawal from narcotics relieves withdrawal 
symptoms (Dawe & Gray, 1995), but the onset of symptom relief is too fast for a direct 
pharmacological effect of oral methadone, demonstrating that expectancies affect the 
perception of withdrawal. Such results are inconsistent with a neurochemical model of 
craving that sees cognitions as purely epiphenomenal, but are consistent with reward or relief 
from perceived or imagined ingestion. 
As already discussed, Robinson & Berridge (1993, 2003) see the mesocorticolimbic 
activation during craving after repeated use of a psychoactive drug as a reflection of non-
hedonic incentive salience. In terms of the EI model, increased incentive salience would tend 
to increase the probability of intrusive thoughts (by increasing the attentional priority of the 
instigating factors in Figure 1). Where incentive salience is strongly developed, it is 
conceivable that the number and attentional priority of associations would be sufficient to 
trigger elaboration even in the face of competing task demands, even if the affective 
component of the thought was reduced or eliminated. However we argue that the continued 
involvement of limbic structures implies a continued affective component to the desire, and 
that the presence of this component continues to exert an influence on elaboration even when 
incentive salience is highly developed.  
Rather than all affective responses to thoughts about psychoactive drugs being 
eliminated over the course of repeated drug use,  there is a progressive move from positive to 
negative reinforcement over time (Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2003), together with a 
increased tendency for the desire to accentuate a sense of deprivation. During this process, 
we argue that the affective accompaniment to desire becomes increasingly ambivalent, and 
the quality of the positive component becomes increasingly characterized by ‘relief’ rather 
than ‘pleasure’. This change to relief may implicate some different neural pathways than are 
seen in pleasure (Stewart, 2000), but we argue that the role of pleasure and relief in our 
theory is the same—hence the presence of both within a single box in Figure 1.  
Aversion 
Desires are particularly aversive in extended deprivation or attempted control. When 
consumption has to be substantially delayed or there is potent current motivation not to 
consume the substance, the predominant emotional response to craving is negative (Cooney 
et al., 1987; Zinser et al., 1992). The effect has been demonstrated with a wide range of 
consummatory targets including alcohol (Cooney et al., 1987), cigarettes (Zinser et al., 1992), 
cocaine (Powell, Bradley & Gray, 1992) and food (McDiarmid & Hethrington, 1995). In a 
context of externally attributed deprivation, the predominant emotion is often frustration or 
anger (Sherman, Morse, & Baker, 1986). Within the EI theory, this effect is linked to a 
heightened sense of deprivation. 
The association between craving and negative emotion during behavioral restraint is 
usually characterized by anxiety (Monti et al., 1993) or guilt (Cooney et al., 1987; 
McDiarmid & Hethrington, 1995), although more complex mixtures of negative emotions 
may also be seen (Powell et al., 1992). Anxiety over craving during an attempt at restraint 
shows some similarity to a “goal violation effect” (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985) within lapses in 
behavior control: It is as if the person sees imagined consumption as tantamount to a 
behavioral violation. The anxiety appears related to an expected difficulty in maintaining 
future restraint (Bandura, 1986; Marlatt & Gordon, 1985). The negative emotion is not 
simply an increased awareness of deprivation, but involves an attribution of the desire to poor 
control (e.g. “I must still be hooked on it if I still feel this way: I’m in danger of losing 
control”). There is sound empirical evidence to support the idea that such interpretations – far 
from being epiphenomenal to behavioral control – are powerful influences on addictive 
behavior (Bandura, 1982; Sitharthan & Kavanagh, 1990). 
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Physiological arousal 
Subjective ratings of desires are loosely linked with physiological arousal (Cepeda-
Benito & Tiffany, 1996; Cooney et al., 1997; Kaplan & et al., 1985) with weak or non-
significant associations often being observed (Drobes & Tiffany, 1997; Maude-Griffin & 
Tiffany, 1996; Tiffany & Hakenewerth, 1991). We argue that these results do not pose 
significant problems for the EI theory. Psychophysiological data such as increased heart rate 
are often ambiguous, potentially confusing activation from desires with preparation for action 
(Sayette et al., 2000), activation from concurrent tasks (Maude-Griffin & Tiffany, 1996) or 
anxiety (e.g. about potential loss of control; McCusker & Brown, 1991). Desires that 
involved more vivid sensory images might be expected within EI theory to have a closer 
relationship with physiological responses than would desires with less imaginal involvement. 
However, such an increased association would only be expected with physiological responses 
in closely related domains (e.g. perhaps between gustatory imagery and salivation). A  close 
correspondence between psychophysiological arousal responses and subjective desire is not 
predicted by the theory, except where there is both an awareness of the psychophysiological 
response and its association with the appetitive target. Furthermore as already argued, the EI 
theory predicts that an initial positive response to the elaboration or intrusion is followed by 
an awareness of deficit and negative affect, so that a complex emotional response should 
occur. It also predicts that the speed and degree of the different reactions would vary, 
depending upon the strength of associations to each affective response (based on the 
individual’s learning history and the presence of neural sensitization or adaptation), and 
depending on the affective context (including the degree to which positive and negative 
aspects of target acquisition were primed). Averaging over episodes or individuals would 
obscure any such irregular patterns.  
Just as we find difficulty interpreting the meaning of physiological arousal that 
accompanies desire, so it is likely that people experiencing desire have this problem as well. 
Arousal in response to desire may be thought to be anxiety or vice versa. We discussed 
evidence supporting misattribution of arousal above in the context of physiological responses 
being a trigger for desire. The issue also applies to the assessment of desire, which may be 
affected by whatever affective cues are salient at the time. Such measurement bias would 
have the effect of reducing any true association between desire and arousal (or indeed, 
between desire and later behavior). 
Lack of concordance is not of course restricted to desire. Rather, as Drummond, 2000, 
pointed out, it is a hallmark of emotional reactions (Lang, 1979; Rankin, Hodgson, & 
Stockwell, 1979). Desynchrony between psychophysiological responses, subjective reports 
and behavior was identified more than 20 years ago by (Lang, 1979), who developed a 
bioinformational model of emotion to explain the phenomenon. Part of the reason for 
desynchrony is that there are substantial individual differences in the patterning of arousal, 
and in the information that is used to identify emotion. The desynchrony between response 
domains in craving and emotion highlights the affective nature of desire (Sayette et al., 
2000), and the multiple components of the reward and relief reactions that accompany it. As 
in other emotional reactions, psychophysiological responses inform the subjective emotional 
experience of desire, but they do not constitute it.  
Effects of expected delay 
A recent study by Sayette, Wertz, Martin, Cohn, Perrot and Hobel (2003) confirmed 
that even very short delays can be associated with different affective correlates of desires. In 
Experiment 2, smokers who were told that they could smoke within 15s were more likely to 
show positive facial expressions than did smokers who were told that there would be a 60s 
delay. An apparent trend to more negative expressions in the longer delay conditions did not 
reach statistical significance in this sample.  
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To summarize, the evidence on affect is consistent with our proposal that desire 
involves both positive and negative emotions. Animal research into motivation over the last 
15 years potentially challenges this view. Essentially, this research suggests that drug use is 
driven by appetitive processes distinct from those that underpin feelings of pleasure. A range 
of psychoactive substances tend to result in reduced hedonic pleasure with repeated use (an 
aspect of tolerance), combined with increased sensitization of dopaminergic systems related 
to reward. This ‘incentive sensitization’ is supported by examination of neural sensitization 
directly, and by the effects of repeated drug use on learning and performance. For example, 
sensitization increases the speed with which rats learn how and where to acquire a drug (see 
Robinson & Berridge, 2003). Observations such as dissociations between liking for particular 
tastes and appetite for them (e.g., Berridge, Venier & Robinson, 1989) led Robinson and 
Berridge (1993) to argue that ‘liking’ or hedonic pleasure associated with reward should be 
distinguished from reward processes related to ‘wanting’ or ‘incentive salience’. A 
distinction of the neural substrates underpinning hedonic processes from those related to 
‘incentive salience’ suggests that with repeated administrations of psychoactive drugs, the 
hedonic aspects of reward may become less important in driving continued elaboration of the 
desire than other pathways involved in reward.  
We posit that a separation of hedonic and ‘incentive salience’ aspects of reward does 
not challenge our position on the affective responses typically related to desires, and does not 
exclude influences between hedonic responses and incentive salience. Although as Robinson 
and Berridge (2003) have shown, unconscious ‘wanting’ is a key mechanism underpinning 
motivated drug use, we argue that conscious positive affect is also important in the subjective 
experience of desire. In particular, the inclusion of pleasure or relief in the EI model as a 
proximal effect of desire-related cognition helps to explain why desire persists even though it 
is ultimately an aversive experience when deprivation is high and target acquisition is 
expected to be delayed or thwarted. We predict that cognitions about substance use, and 
particularly sensory images, will continue to elicit some immediate sense of pleasure or relief 
even in the context of repeated use or entrenched substance dependence, and that this 
affective reaction rewards attention to and elaboration of the desire cognition. The repeated 
use of psychoactive substances results in a movement from a focus on pleasure to an 
increasing role for relief, and the subsequent sense of deprivation is amplified, leading to an 
increased ambivalence in the affective response. However, affective connotations to the 
cognition remain. 
Desire is one of many factors that influence target acquisition and consumption 
Target acquisition behaviors and desire have mutual influences in the EI theory. 
Controlled processing of responses increases explicit desire, and is itself maintained by 
desire. When target acquisition is being planned and directed, the process provides further 
information to elaborate the desire, and conversely the elaboration of desires often retrieves 
information that is relevant to response planning and direction. So, an exhausted traveler may 
elaborate a desire image that involves stopping at a nearby hotel and retiring to a soft bed. 
The reinforcing nature of the thought provides salient incentive information. However the 
construction of an elaborated, episodic image may also incorporate procedural information 
such as the route that can be taken to the hotel or how a reservation may be obtained. Of 
course, not all desire-related thoughts include response information, and some information 
that is generated in response direction may be incompatible with the desire (e.g. the cost of 
the room).  
Popular conceptions of desire give it a central place in the development of excessive 
consumption (Jellinek, 1960). EI theory sees desire as only one of many factors in the 
determination of target acquisition (cf. Tiffany, 1990), and it identifies several limitations to 
behavioral predictions from subjective desire reports. One limit to the predictive ability of 
desire is the way in which it is assessed. Although desire in the EI theory is a conscious 
cognitive event, and therefore available to introspective judgment, assessment of desire 
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requires accurate recollection of events that are variable in affective intensity and are 
sometimes fleeting. If the person is asked to make a single intensity rating about desires that 
occurred over periods as long as a week, the ratings are likely to be influenced by a range of 
biases including the salience of each desire episode and beliefs about the desire. Even if the 
global measure of desires or urges relates to a testing session, limits to the relationship with 
behaviors such as reaction times will be seen at specific test points (Cepeda-Benito & 
Tiffany, 1996) unless the level of desire is relatively constant. Attempts to predict 
consumption levels in the natural environment from desires that are assessed in a clinic or 
laboratory will also be weak (Rohsenow et al., 1994), unless the desires are particularly 
insensitive to both time and context (cf.Mischel, 1968).  Reports are also potentially subject 
to self-presentation, especially if they are collected in a clinic setting  (e.g. Stormark et al., 
1995).  Individual differences in these effects would impair the ability of desires to predict 
subsequent behavior.   
An underestimation of predictive relationships may also result from a reliance on 
measures of desire intensity (Tiffany, Carter, & Singleton, 2000; Tiffany & Drobes, 1991; cf. 
Monti et al, 2000). We argue that desires vary not only in affective intensity and salience, but 
also in frequency and duration. The time course of desire may sometimes be more important 
than its intensity at one point in time. Shiffman et al. (1997) found that duration of 
temptations to smoke on the Quit Day were strongly related to subsequent lapses, and that 
lapses were preceded by linear increases in waking urges to smoke over the previous three 
days. Maintaining control in the face of sustained periods of high desire may present 
particularly demanding challenges. 
A pathway to behavior through elaboration provides several ways in which the desire 
may not lead to an associated response, even when it is very strong. This aspect of the EI 
theory incorporates several social-cognitive elements (Bandura, 1986; Monti, Rohsenhow & 
Hutchison, 2000). First, we predict that the linkage to responses may be moderated by 
attention diversion. Because the response direction is dependent on limited working memory 
resources, if another cognitive task captures these resources, the response preparation will be 
interrupted (unless of course there are strong associative response links that can take over). 
Second, the operation of the desire occurs in the presence of other potential incentives. So, 
the tired traveler may continue home, with the prospect of a loved one waiting at home being 
sufficient to overcome the wish to stop at the hotel. Some of these considerations may 
involve disincentives—for example, the traveler’s boss may be annoyed by the excuse of 
staying at the hotel. Third, the target may be thought to be difficult to achieve with the 
resources and skills that can be brought to bear. The tired traveler may not be sure of finding 
the hotel. In consequence of these other factors, the focus of response-related cognition may 
become the inhibition of the immediate response to the desire (taking the hotel exit) or 
engagement in incompatible activity (e.g. selecting a faster way to travel home).  
Factors influencing explicit control of responses are not simply nuisance variables, 
muddying the power of desires to predict and determine behavior. The potential for 
competing incentives and for control of responses is a source of liberation, providing people 
with the power to select and control behavior, even in the face of strong desires (Bandura, 
1999). High-risk situations can be predicted and avoided (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985), and 
coping strategies for them can be acquired and applied. Social assistance can be obtained to 
make behavioral inhibition easier. A search for successful past control can be initiated, so 
that self-efficacy is maximized. Disincentives for consumption and incentives for control can 
be elicited, including self-incentives. The desires themselves can be preempted and their 
nature and duration can be modified. These variables provide opportunities for self-regulation 
and for effective treatment. 
The relationship between desire and behavior is modulated in complex ways by 
mood. Negative mood contributes directly to desire by accentuating the sense of target 
deficit, and amplifies incentives for behavior that is expected to relieve the deficit. It also 
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influences behavior through effects on self-efficacy. Negative mood impairs self-efficacy for 
target acquisition if there is any room for doubt (potentiating perceptions of high task 
difficulty and poor past achievement – Kavanagh, 1992; Kavanagh & Bower, 1985), but the 
impact on self-efficacy is even greater in behavior control, because of the variability that 
typically exists in control achievements.  The person will often see themselves as unable to 
inhibit target acquisition when they are feeling low (Kavanagh, 1992; Marlatt & Gordon, 
1985).  
Target acquisition may also occur without a high level of explicit desire. Where the 
target is highly available and there are no significant disincentives for acquisition, it may take 
very little desire to initiate action (e.g. accepting a free drink on an aircraft). In the EI theory, 
target acquisition may also occur when associative processes trigger behavior with little 
cognitive elaboration. Associative processes may create decisional biases that indirectly 
result in acquisition becoming more likely. The notion that processes underlying response 
selection may operate outside awareness, through decisional biases, is not a new one 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Zajonc, 1980). The EI theory does 
not assume introspective access to any of the cognitive processes it describes—only to the 
products of those processes. So, if an associative link has previously been established 
between a desired activity such as drinking and a particular route that passes a bar, it may 
sometimes be the preference for the route that is consciously experienced rather than an 
explicit desire for alcohol (cf. the notion of “apparently irrelevant decisions”; Marlatt & 
Gordon, 1985). Once in the context where the target is highly available or other incentive 
processes (e.g. social reinforcers) become operative, target acquisition may then occur even if 
the current explicit desire for alcohol is not particularly high.  
EI theory predicts that an effect of decisional biases on behavior without any 
conscious desire for the target will be the exception rather than the rule. The EI theory posits 
that associative processes that trigger decisional biases also trigger intrusive thoughts. 
Therefore we predict that where a biased retrieval of response-related information does occur, 
it will typically be preceded by a transitory intrusive thought about the target. The person 
may not be fully aware that their decision is related to the fleeting thought, but they were 
aware of the thought at the time.  
An associative link from stimulus cues to overlearned, automatized action schemata 
may also result in some acquisition behaviors (Tiffany, 1990). This idea has some plausibility 
when consumption in substance dependence is closely observed (Nil, Buzzi, & Bättig, 1984). 
A familiar example is a person lighting a cigarette when they already have one in an ashtray 
or even in their mouth. However, while complex response chaining can become automatic 
with repetition (driving a car is a familiar example), we predict that the effect of automatized 
action schemata will typically be restricted to simple behaviors (such as reaching for a 
cookie, or lighting a cigarette), and to situations where the appetitive target is readily 
available and attention is gripped by a concurrent task (such as reading this paper). As 
Tiffany (1990) pointed out, absent-minded lapses of this kind during a control attempt can be 
seen as a type of action slip that has been extensively studied in other domains (Norman, 
1981). One reason for a restricted role for automatised responses is the same as in decisional 
biases: elements of a complex response chain each have the potential to elicit associated 
intrusive thoughts about the target, at which point the process becomes explicit, and target 
acquisition is either inhibited or consciously pursued. A further reason is that minor changes 
in the behavioral requirements almost always require controlled processing at some time 
during a response chain, because minor variations of performance will be required on 
different occasions (e.g. the cigarette lighter is in a different place). While we may well have 
another set of highly practised skills we can bring into play to deal with the new situation, 
their selection requires controlled processing. 
We therefore argue that the prototypical situation is that behavior is consciously 
directed. Conscious direction of target acquisition is initiated by, and contributes to, desire. 
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When associative links trigger intrusive thoughts, the momentary awareness of desire results 
in conscious response direction, even when the component behaviors remain simple and well-
practised. Target acquisition in the absence of desire represents an accidental lapse of control 
rather than the norm. 
Predictive association.   
The presence of a relationship between desires and related behavior is supported by 
links between heightened craving and subsequent relapses in addictive disorders (Swan, 
Ward, & Jack, 1996). For example Killen and Fortmann (1997) found highly significant 
relationships between high levels of craving by 2,600 former smokers and their relapse over 
the following 12 months. The relative increase in risk of relapse from high craving was 
substantial (2.18 for men and 1.60 for women). Laboratory studies also show an association 
between craving and work to obtain the substance, especially in situations where reported 
craving is highly salient (Ludwig & Wikler, 1974).  
The importance of thoughts about the target is illustrated by data on delay of 
gratification. One research paradigm involved giving children a choice between a small but 
immediate reward and a delayed and more substantial one (Mischel, Ebbeson, & Raskoff-
Zeiss, 1972). If children attended to the desirable qualities of the delayed reward, they waited 
for shorter periods of time than when they were distracted from these thoughts (Mischel & 
Ebbeson, 1970; Mischel et al., 1972; Rodriguez, Mischel, & Shoda, 1989). Such findings 
support the generality of causal relationships between a preoccupation with consummatory 
thoughts and subsequent consumption.  
Also consistent with the EI theory is that the correlations between subjective craving 
and subsequent consumption are often relatively weak (Tiffany, 1990, 1999; Weiss, Griffin, 
& Hufford, 1995). While such results are often subject to the assessment problems discussed 
above, the evidence shows that desire does not have a univariate, causal relationship with 
related behavior. Not all consumption is related to high levels of desire, and high levels of 
desire do not necessarily lead to consumption (Kranzler, Mulgrew, Modesto-Lowe, & 
Burleson, 1999; Tiffany, 1990). 
Associative pathway to target acquisition  
Substance-related memory associations, an index of cognitive availability, have been 
shown to predict later consumption of both alcohol and marihuana (Stacy, 1997). Their 
predictive contribution is more powerful than substance expectancies, and remains after 
previous consumption level is controlled. However, it is not clear which processes drive this 
predictive link—for example the data are consistent with effects of intrusive thoughts on 
automatized responses, effects on retrieval of response information, or effects operating 
through conscious elaborative processes.  
Neuroanatomical data 
The idea that there may be separable influences from automatic and controlled aspects 
of desire upon substance use gains some added credence from an elegant series of 
neuroanatomical studies by Bechara and colleagues on decision making (Bechara, Damasio 
& Damasio, 2000). These studies have separated effects of frontal areas underpinning the 
situational re-experiencing of emotions (including the ventromedial orbitofrontal cortex; VM) 
from ones implicated in working memory (including dorsolateral prefrontal areas). The 
studies rely on the effects of VM injury on the ability to learn appetitive event probabilities 
and make associated decisions. They suggest that working memory relating to emotional 
consequences can be intact despite VM injury, but that re-experiencing of the emotional 
reaction from memories of events is impaired by this injury. Optimally functional decision 
making requires both intact working memory and intact emotional associations.  
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This research is consistent with desire being an interplay between cognition and 
emotional-motivational systems, and suggests that this interplay is a general feature of target 
acquisition and consumption. The work is also consistent with our suggestion that there is 
both an automatic and a controlled influence of desires upon substance use, and the existence 
of two neuroanatomical pathways that appear to influence motivational decisions makes it 
conceivable that partial dissociation of the processes may sometimes occur (e.g. as previously 
argued, under situations of high competitive working memory load). It is not yet clear how 
the processes identified by Bechara et al. (2000) relate to our distinction between associative 
and elaborative processes 
Multiple determinants of consumption.  
Consistent with our contention, a limiting factor on the predictive effect of a specific 
desire on subsequent behavior is the moderation of its influence by competing incentives 
(Covington & Omelich, 1992).  Desires focus on immediate reinforcement from the behavior 
(Powell et al., 1992). The desire would not occur if proximal negative consequences 
predominated (“I’ll be sick if I eat another chocolate”).  However, negative expectancies for 
the behavior (or positive expectancies for control) can also influence consumption (Breiner, 
Stritzke, & Lang, 1999). There are individual differences in the extent that negative 
expectancies are elicited in temptation situations (Avants, Margolin, Kosten, & Cooney, 
1995), and increasing the salience and perceived relevance of inhibitory factors is an 
important therapeutic procedure in the reduction of substance misuse (Miller & Rollnick, 
1991). Even the drinking of people with severe alcohol dependence can be moderated in the 
short term by introducing sufficient external rewards for control (Cohen, Liebson, Faillace, & 
Allen, 1971; Griffiths, Bigelow, & Liebson, 1977).  
There is also substantial evidence in favor of behavioral influence from other social-
cognitive variables (Bandura, 1986, 1999). The mastery of relevant skills in target acquisition 
or behavioral control (Bliss, Garvey, & Ward, 1999; Litman, Stapleton, Oppenheim, Peleg, & 
Jackson, 1984; Shiffman, Paty, Gnys, Kassel, & Hickcox, 1996), and the degree of related 
self-efficacy (Kavanagh, Pierce, Lo, & Shelley, 1993; Niaura, 2000; Sitharthan & Kavanagh, 
1990) are particularly important factors. Situational difficulty also is important:  This 
includes the availability of the appetitive target and possibility of consumption (Palij et al., 
1996; Shiffman et al., 1996).  When considering behavioral inhibition, it involves the 
situational difficulty in resisting consumption (Shiffman et al., 1996) and presence of 
response aids.  
If there is nothing to inhibit consumption and the relevant object is readily available, 
consumption may occur at very low levels of desire. On the other hand, consumption can be 
controlled even when craving is high, provided other variables favor restraint (Sitharthan, 
Sitharthan, Hough, & Kavanagh, 1997). This is consistent with the contention in the EI 
theory that desire is a factor affecting subsequent behavior, but that it is only one among 
many.  
Summary of the current empirical status of EI theory 
We began work on the EI theory partly in an attempt to integrate the evidence on 
craving and place it in the wider context of cognitive-emotional mechanisms of motivation 
and desire. The theory is highly consistent with both the evidence prior to 1999, when we 
began this work, and data that have emerged since that time. The empirical support includes 
data from proximal self-reports, but the potential for error in subjective judgments is 
explicated. 
There is particularly well-documented evidence for the ‘input’ and ‘output’ 
components of the theory, that is, for factors that elicit desire and for the consequences of 
desire for behavior. A large body of data supports the view that conditioned cues, 
anticipatory responses and negative affect trigger craving, and that consumption is modulated 
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by factors such as self-efficacy as well as by craving strength. Ongoing contention focuses on 
the extent that controlled response direction rather than decisional biases influence target 
acquisition, and on the idea that biased decision making is typically preceded by conscious 
desire. The affective nature of desire is also well documented, although there is some 
contention over the extent to which affective responses drive attentional allocation to the 
target.  
The distinction between intrusive thoughts and cognitive elaboration in craving is 
supported by data on the availability of target-related information and on the failure of 
attempted thought suppression, as well as by self-reports of transient intrusive thoughts.  
Elaborated thoughts, resulting from directed search and retention of target-related 
information, are indicated by interference between desire-related ruminations and concurrent 
cognitive tasks, and by data on instructed instigation of appetitive ruminations. The focus of 
the EI theory on the role of imagery is highly consistent with a range of data including 
evidence on the efficacy of imagery in eliciting desire, recent findings that visual imagery is 
particularly effective at reducing craving (Harvey et al, 2004; Panabokke et al, under review), 
and by self-reports of appetitive imagery during craving.  
The balance of current evidence suggests that conscious desires are not merely 
epiphenomenal. They play an active role in the determination of target acquisition, albeit one 
that is modulated by many other factors. They directly affect cognition. Even when desires do 
not lead to related behavior, their occurrence can have functional impact. During desire 
episodes, the person will appear absent-minded or lose concentration. This in itself could 
have important consequences on both work performance and leisure activities. In cases where 
the desire is associated with an intense awareness of deficit, it would also reduce the pleasure 
obtained from other activities. These effects of desires may often be much more important 
than their influence on target acquisition, especially when that behavior is functional.  
Predictions of the EI theory 
While the EI theory provides a good fit with existing evidence, a true test of the 
theory requires that it be able to make predictions about new directions for research. Some 
recent findings from our own laboratories that have been inspired by the theory have been 
presented throughout the paper, as have some specific predictions that can be investigated. 
Further tests of the theory could focus, inter alia, on the issues detailed below. 
1. Automatic and elaborative processes in craving can be distinguished. Since this 
postulate is central to our theory, each of the following predictions are critical to it: 
o Unelaborated intrusive desire thoughts will occur on some occasions 
without being further elaborated. While this is expected to be more 
common when deprivation is low or the target is not highly valued, there 
will also be at least some intrusions at times of higher deprivation, when 
concurrent cognitive activity impairs elaboration of the desire-related 
cognition.   
o Differential brain activation will be associated with unelaborated intrusive 
thoughts and elaboration.  
o Attempted suppression will increase the availability of desire-related 
information during the suppression task or immediately subsequent to it. 
Replication of the effects observed in the small number of studies on the 
matter to date is required. These observations would demonstrate a linkage 
between desires and other research on intrusive cognition. Effects will still 
be present even when elaboration is inhibited by the presence of a 
competing task.  
o Attempted suppression of intrusive thoughts will lead to similar brain 
activation as  in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), because of close 
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apparent parallels between the phenomena of thought suppression in 
craving and OCD. A similarity between orbitofrontal activation in desires 
and in OCD has previously been observed. Our view is that this effect will 
be particularly marked where an attempt is made to suppress the intrusive 
thought.  
2. Our contention that desires typically involve sensory images is the most novel 
aspect of our theory, although the central model (as illustrated in Figure 1) does not 
stand or fall on this point, since desire-related propositional representations could still 
elicit pleasure or relief and attentional allocation. Our assertion about the importance 
of imagery would imply that:  
o Desires will show similar brain activation to that seen in  imagery. While 
existing brain activation data is consistent with this prediction, these 
studies have typically used imagery to evoke the desire. Research is 
needed in naturally occurring desire episodes where imagery is not evoked 
instructionally. 
o Mutual competition will be seen between desire imagery and modality-
specific concurrent tasks. While we have already gathered some evidence 
on the effects of other imagery in suppressing desire, further research is 
needed to confirm our prediction of greater interference from competing 
tasks that require similar working memory resources then from those that 
do not. 
o Episodes of desire with more vivid sensory images will be rated as 
stronger in intensity. 
3. While EI theory acknowledges that target acquisition can represent a learned 
behavior that need not be preceded by desire on every occasion, the theory  
asserts that changes in desires are involved in the causation of changes in target 
acquisition rather than being epiphenomenal. An appropriate test of this prediction 
requires that the measure of desire is proximal and sensitive, and that other potential 
causal factors (i.e. competing incentives, target availability, relevant skills) are 
controlled. Most current tests of behavioral predictions from desires do not meet these 
criteria. 
Treatment implications 
The EI theory also has potential implications for treatment of addictive problems (see 
Kavanagh, Andrade & May, 2004).  We do not propose these treatment implications as 
providing a powerful test of the theory, since it is difficult to control all relevant factors in 
even the best-designed clinical trial. To the extent that existing treatment already improves 
control skills sufficiently, there is also a potential for ceiling effects in behavioral outcomes 
and for a habituation of craving to environmental cues in the natural environment.  
o Existing psychological interventions already incorporate some elements that 
would be expected from EI theory to assist with craving. For example, the 
prediction and avoidance of high-risk situations for behavioral lapses (Chaney, 
O’Leary, & Marlatt, 1978) is likely not only to reduce the risk of relapse, but 
of intense desire as well. A cognitive approach may well examine the accuracy 
of overly positive expectancies from the addictive behavior, or address 
secondary dysphoria about craving, among other cognitive targets (cf. Beck, 
Wright, Newman, et al., 1993). However, the application of other aspects of EI 
theory should further increase the effectiveness of existing psychological 
treatment for control of craving and its effects. These include:For instigation 
of the desire: The identification of dysphoria and periods of non-target 
deprivation as risks for desire elicitation; reattribution of desire during those 
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states to other deprivation; and application of problem solving and response 
plans to prevent or address irrelevant deprivation.  
o For dysfunctional coping strategies:  In vivo demonstration of the 
ineffectiveness of thought suppression; and promotion of ‘accepting and 
letting go’ of the desire-related thoughts (e.g. in mindfulness meditation—cf. 
Breslin, Zack, & McKain, 2002; Teasdale, Segal, Williams et al., 2000)..  
o For functional coping: (once an understanding of ‘accept and let go’ is 
achieved), the application of competing imagery or other tasks with high 
working memory load to deal with elaboration. 
Conclusion 
We propose a comprehensive theory of desire that does not view it as an 
epiphenomenon, but also avoids an assertion that it is the sole determinant of target 
acquisition. The theory attempts to describe and explain the processes underpinning a variety 
of desires, including those for psychoactive substances. It incorporates both ‘automatic’ or 
associative processes underpinning the subjective phenomenon of intrusive desire-related 
thoughts, as well as more ‘controlled’ processes of elaboration. It encompasses a 
phenomenon that offers an “imaginary relish” that enchants our senses, but also can represent 
an exquisite torture like that experienced by the legendary Tantalus. The relish seduces us 
into successive elaborations of the desire, but the piquancy of this relish also amplifies a 
sense of deprivation and torture when the target cannot immediately be obtained. Our theory 
emphasizes the role of sensory images and anticipatory responses in desire cognition, and 
particularly the potential of these sensory experiences to elicit strong affective reactions. It 
predicts that episodes of desire may not only interfere with other tasks, but also that 
appropriately designed tasks may avert or halt the episode. The theory offers a rich source for 
programs of research into desire that may further elucidate the phenomenon.  
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Footnotes 
1. We do not speculate on the precise nature of desire-related cognition in animals, 
except to say that we expect the differences to relate primarily to the extent of 
elaboration and associated metacognitions rather than to the essential nature of the 
related attentional salience or affective response.  
2. The level of affective reaction that is needed before elaboration is triggered cannot be 
precisely specified a priori. Average levels of experimental manipulations such as 
deprivation durations may be derived empirically, but their impact will remain 
probabilistic.  
3. Compare Robinson and Berridge’s (2003) distinction between ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’, 
but note that we are talking about the conscious affective and cognitive experiences 
that constitute desire whereas, at least in later expositions of their theory, Robinson 
and Berridge use ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’ to denote implicit underpinnings of desire. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. The Elaborated Intrusion (EI) Theory of Desire.  
The central box contains the subjective components of desire. Rounded external 
boxes represent antecedents or external factors, and rectangular internal boxes are the 
products of automatic and elaborative processing, indicated by arrows. Automatic 
components of desire (light arrows) lead to apparently spontaneous thoughts that are 
perceived as intrusive. An elaborative cycle (dark arrows) encompasses the cognitive 
processes involved in retrieval of semantic, episodic and sensory information from long-term 
memory, and the use of that information to construct quasi-lifelike images of the desired 
target. Elaborative processing also increases the immediate likelihood of further activation of 
antecedents, through attentional changes and working memory prioritization (not indicated in 
the figure). Substance dependence increases the longer term likelihood of the activation of 
antecedents, through phenomena such as incentive sensitization (Robinson & Berridge, 
1993). While the immediate affective consequences of desire related imagery are positive, an 
increasing sense of associated deficit feeds back to negative affect. 
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